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Article
International Responsibility for Human
Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes
Klint A. Cowant
The American Indian tribes have a unique status in the law of the United
States. They are characterized as sovereigns that predate the formation of
the republic and possess inherent powers and immunities. Their powers
permit them to create and enforce laws and generally to operate as
autonomous governmental entities with executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Tribes enjoy immunity from suit and exemption from
federal and state constitutional provisions which protect individual
rights. These powers and immunities provide a connection between tribal
governments and U.S. international human rights obligations. This
Article explores that connection. It examines whether the tribes may
breach certain international human rights obligations of the United
States, whether tribal violations may incur U.S. international
responsibility, and if so, what consequences might result. It constructs an
argument that the United States has failed to implement fully its
international human rights obligations and that it can be held
internationally responsible for tribal violations of human rights. This
argument leads to policy recommendations for the United States and
tribal governments.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent work on international human rights and indigenous peoples
focuses on the promotion and protection of "self-determination" and on
the development of group rights.' This work builds upon the significant
progress indigenous peoples have made toward the development of
collective rights under international law.2 International human rights
tribunals have decided cases dealing with the rights of indigenous
peoples, 3  while individual members of indigenous groups have
successfully challenged State4 violations of international human rights.5
1. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed., 2004)
(detailing the emerging role of indigenous peoples in international law); Harriet Ketley,
Exclusion by Definition: Access to International Tribunals for the Enforcement of the Collective Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, 8 INT'L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 331 (2001) (identifying fora available to
indigenous peoples to assert rights against the State); Fergus MacKay, The Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in International Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTING NORMS IN
A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Lubya Zarsky ed., 2003) (examining the connections between
collective rights of indigenous peoples, the environment, and international law).
2. This progress has come largely through the work of indigenous peoples coming together
under the auspices of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Through the Working Group, the Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on
Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/2/29 (Aug. 23, 1993), was developed and the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has approved it. U.N. Comm. on
Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities,
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Technical Review of the United Nations Draft Declaration
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Apr. 20, 1994).
The International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning the Protection of
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991), provides for the protection of indigenous individuals and
"peoples." Id. at art. 1.3 (requiring that "peoples" shall not be interpreted as having any
implications which may attach to the term under international law). The work of indigenous
peoples in the international plane has been directed at preventing violations of indigenous
individual or collective rights by States. See generally ANNA MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-68 (2001). The governmental nature of the American Indian tribes
provides an opportunity to examine potential international consequences of individual rights
violations by an indigenous group operating as a sub-State government.
3. Although declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Cherokee
Nation case brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
provides a good example of the types of cases indigenous groups might pursue against States
in the international arena. Cherokee Nation v. United States, Case 11.071, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 6/97, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.a5, doc. 7 (1997).
4. This Article distinguishes the traditional subjects of public international law, "States,"
from the federated political entities of the United States, "states," by capitalizing the former
but not the latter.
5. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
75/02/OEA/Ser. L/V/ll 717, doc. 1 rev. 1 96-98 (2001) (finding the United States
internationally responsible for violations of the property rights of the members of the Western
Shoshone tribe); Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R 6/24, U.N. Human Rights
Comm'n, Supp. No. 40, 166 (1981) (declaring Canada responsible for continuing violation of
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The study of indigenous peoples and international law has thus been
mostly limited to the development and conceptualization of indigenous
groups' (or indigenous individuals') rights against the State.
6 This narrow
approach to the overlap between international human rights law,
municipal law, and indigenous rights neglects potential consequences of
individual human rights violations by indigenous groups.
The indigenous peoples of the United States, the American Indian
tribes, have legislative authority, executive departments, police, and
prisons. They resemble sub-State units of government, and exercise
extensive governmental authority. This governmental status raises several
questions about the potential for tribal entities to violate individual human
rights as protected by international law binding on the United States. Can
the tribes exercise their governmental powers in a manner which violates
an asserted human right? Has the United States implemented human
rights protections against the tribes? Can tribal conduct constitute a breach
of international human rights obligations binding on the United States and,
if so, what are the consequences? And perhaps most importantly, is tribal
conduct attributable to the United States under international law?
This Article explores these questions, with a principle focus on whether
the United States itself could incur international responsibility for human
rights violations committed by American Indian tribes. The scope of the
Article is thus modest. It does not attempt to engage with normative
problems as to whether indigenous peoples or other sub-State entities
should be bound by international human rights norms. In fact, because
human rights are so often individual rights, tribes and other sub-State
entities do not need to be bound by international norms for accountability
still to attach. Only one entity, the State, as a subject of international law,
may be internationally responsible for violations of those individual
rights.7 Under the international law of State responsibility, sub-State
individual rights of aboriginal women and their children); Kitok v. Sweden, Communication
No. 197/1985, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/85 (finding no
internationally wrongful act in the denial of an individual's asserted right to herd reindeer).
6. See, e.g., Curtis G. Berkley, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-
Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65 (1992) (maintaining that tribes
should use international law in securing a right of self-determination against federal
abrogation); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self-
Preservation, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 179 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (asserting
inadequacies of a liberal conception of individual rights in the protection of indigenous
peoples); Ketley, supra note 1 (exploring the procedural difficulties facing indigenous groups
as non-State entities in asserting claims in international tribunals); Benedict Kingsbury,
Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples' Claims in International and
Comparative Law, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 64 (Phillip Alston ed., 2001) (refining theory for potential
indigenous assertion of collective rights in international law); Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by
non-State Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (1992) (developing theory for
discourse of groups in international law in claims for self-determination, minority rights,
historical sovereignty, and indigenous rights).
7. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session (Apr. 23 -
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entities cannot themselves be responsible for violations of a State's
international human rights obligations.8 The obligations which bind the
United States extend to every person within U.S. territory or control,
regardless of whether such individuals are tribal members, non-tribal
members, or foreign nationals.9 If an individual right is violated and the
violation is attributable to the United States, then the United States bears
international responsibility for it. These are the presumptions
underpinning this work: that the United States is bound by certain
conventional and customary international human rights norms and that all
individuals within U.S. territory or control hold such basic rights.
Although this Article uses language such as "tribal violations of human
rights," strictly speaking these statements refer to a tribal act or omission
which breaches an individual right that is protected by international law
and that binds the United States. A tribe may violate an individual's
internationally protected right because the individual is a bearer of such
right, not because the international human right law at issue binds the
tribe.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I outlines the status of
American Indian tribes in U.S. federal law. It explores their status as
sovereigns, defines their governmental powers, and identifies the
municipal law doctrine of sovereign immunity. This doctrine becomes
particularly relevant in later sections which explore the gaps in U.S.
implementation of its international human rights obligations. Part II lays
out the relevant human rights obligations binding on the United States and
then attempts to show that there are substantive and procedural gaps in
the implementation of these obligations. However, these gaps are
identified in U.S. reservations and declarations to the international
community. Because these obligations are neither exempted from coverage
under international instruments nor currently enforced under U.S. federal
law, the United States may have left itself vulnerable to international
enforcement for alleged violations. The last part of Part II examines the
possibility of tribal actions violating an individual's international human
rights and identifies certain human rights provisions that are particularly
susceptible to tribal violation. Part III discusses the potential remedies
available for violations of individual rights under municipal law, including
both tribal and federal remedies. It demonstrates that most remedies can
only be obtained in a tribal forum and addresses the implications of this
June 1 & July 2 - Aug. 10, 2001), U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10, at 63-80, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Articles].
8. See Dominic McGoldrick, State Responsibility and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS 161 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Dan Sarooshi eds., 2004).
9.See, e.g., Theodor Schilling, Is THE UNITED STATES BOUND BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN RELATION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?
(N.Y.U. School of Law, Global Law Working Paper 08/04, 2004) (exploring the limits of
extraterritorial application of United States international human rights obligations).
[Vol. 9
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reality. Part IV completes this examination of accountability, by arguing
that international law permits actions of the tribes or of tribal officials to be
attributed to the United States and identifying several tribunals with
authority to hear a human rights claim against the United States. Finally,
Part V concludes by suggesting implementation policies that the United
States may choose to adopt to avoid being held internationally responsible
for a human rights violation by tribes or tribal officials. As a counter-
balance, Part V also identifies means available to tribes to forestall
unwanted federal action that might infringe upon their political
independence and sovereignty.
I. STATUS OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES IN MUNICIPAL LAW
A. Tribes as Political Communities
American Indian tribes, as acknowledged in the U.S. Constitution,
10 are
distinct, self-governing political communities with their own legal systems
separate from federal or state governments." The several hundred tribal
governments operating in the continental United States vary in size and
complexity and assert authority over a broad diversity of polities and
territories.12 Certain California rancherias, for instance, comprise only a few
families and acres of land, 13 whereas the Navajo Nation, one of the largest
tribes, operates as a complex political community whose population
approximates Iceland's and whose territorial extent rivals that of the
Republic of Ireland.
14
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, among the states, and with the Indian tribes); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excluding
Indians who are taxed from definition of free persons for purposes of apportionment). Other
constitutional provisions which do not mention the tribes explicitly have recognized further
delegated powers of the federal government over Indian tribes. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(treaty power); U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 11 (war power); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (power
over federal property).
11. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
12. This Article uses "tribal government" to refer to the legislative, executive,
administrative, and judicial bodies established under the particular tribal constitution.
13. For instance, the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians, a federally recognized tribe
with twelve members, occupies a reservation of approximately 67 acres. See TILLER'S GUIDE
TO INDIAN COUNTRY 383 (Veronica E. Velarde Tiller ed., 2005); National Indian Gaming
Commission, Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians Land Determination (June 30, 2005)
available at www.nigc.gov/nigc/documents/land/buenavista-pgl.jsp (last visited Nov. 19,
2005).
14. The Navajo Nation comprises approximately 68,909 square kilometers of land while the
Irish Republic comprises 68,890 square kilometers. The Navajo Nation's population is
approximately 180,462, while Iceland's 2005 population was estimated to be 296,737. TILLER'S
GUIDE TO INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 13, at 328; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK 2005, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ic.html.
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Citizens of tribes are typically referred to as "members," and most
tribes have exclusive authority to define their membership or enrollment.15
Membership in a tribal polity is a political, not a racial or ethnic,
classification.16  Although the tribes comprise mainly indigenous
individuals descended from pre-Columbian inhabitants of North America,
tribes are not necessarily ethnically homogenous. They have been
voluntarily and forcibly integrated with others,17 and several tribes
historically naturalized non-indigenous peoples, such as escaped or freed
African slaves. 18 In addition to tribal membership, American Indians born
in U.S. territory hold both national and state citizenship.19 Certain tribes
whose territory has been severed by the U.S.-Mexican or U.S.-Canadian
national borders may enroll members from the non-U.S. side of the
boundary, making it possible for some tribal members to be foreign
nationals but not others.
B. Tribal Sovereignty
U.S. municipal law conceptualizes tribal governments as one of three
sovereign" institutions, in addition to federal and state governments. This
system regards American Indian tribes as pre-existing entities outside the
federal framework.20 Yet even the structural interaction of tribes with the
United States government has not been simple. In several respects, United
States law categorizes tribes as entities analogous to foreign States rather
than regional sub-State entities. 21 Notably, until 1871 the federal
15. Unless limited by treaty or statute, each tribe as a body politic has the power to
determine its own membership. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Roff v.
Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1897).
16. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (stating that Indian preference "is
political rather than racial in nature").
17. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76; Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation,
193 U.S. 127 (1904) (holding that intertribal agreement established citizenship rights and
requirements).
18. See generally WILLIAM KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERITAGE (1986); KENNET
PORTER, THE BLACK SEMINOLES (1996). See also Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, No.
JAT-04-09 (Cherokee March 7, 2006) (holding that statutory blood quantum
requirement for membership in the Nation violates Cherokee Nation
constitutional provision extending membership to freedmen).
19.8 U.S.C § 1401(h) (2000) (naturalizing Indians born in U.S. territory); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
20. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896) (dismissing habeas corpus proceeding
against Cherokee Nation high sheriff and holding that Cherokee Nation powers of
government do not flow from the federal constitutional arrangement); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (stating that tribes possess inherent powers of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty, act of Congress or by implication, so violation of tribal law by member
constitutes a violation against a sovereign separate from the federal or state governments).
21. The.historical justifications for treatment of the American Indian tribes as sovereigns
emerge from the European doctrine of discovery. This doctrine gave the discovering
European country title to the lands of non-Christian peoples against all other European
powers. This right was subject to an Indian right of occupancy which only the discovering
[Vol. 9
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government dealt with the tribes through treaties which U.S. courts
continue to classify as equivalent to international treaties in municipal
law.2
Each tribe's governmental powers vary depending on its unique treaty
history and applicable acts of Congress. To encompass this diversity, and
to evaluate effectively the tribal-international human rights law nexus, this
Article uses a broad concept, of tribal authority.23 Within this broad
category, two general types of American Indian tribes must be
distinguished: those recognized by the federal government and those
without such recognition. Federal recognition weaves tribes into the fabric
of U.S. constitutional law by accommodating certain tribal powers and
immunities within municipal law.
2 4 Unrecognized tribes may possess
rights normally held by political communities (such as treaty-based
hunting or fishing rights) against the United States, but municipal law
largely regards tribes without federal recognition as private collective
associations rather than as governments with legislative or enforcement
jurisdiction.25
In the U.S. Supreme Court's foundational Indian-law trilogy of cases,
26
power could acquire through purchase or conquest. The British right to acquire lands in
North America passed to the United States after the American Revolution. See Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 571-75 (1823). A distinctly American version of the public international
law doctrine, occupatio bellica, has been identified as the root of federal power over tribes. This
doctrine refers to a persisting conquered people, such as the French after 1940. Robert Cooter
& Wofgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal
Courts (Part I of II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 295-309 (1998) (characterizing the position of the
tribes as analogous to occupatio bellica and developing three phases for the historical
deprivation of tribal sovereignty: (1) independence and autonomy; (2) conquest and
submission; (3) modern tribal government with dependent sovereignty). It has also been
argued that no legal basis exists for the legitimate assertion of U.S. municipal law over the
tribes. See, e.g., Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the Indian Nations,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1595 (2004). Laying these historical problems to one side, a summary of
United States municipal law vis-A-vis the tribes provides a foundation for examining
implementation of international obligations against these unique sub-State governmental
entities.
22. See, e.g., Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that
Indian treaties are equivalent in status to treaties with foreign nations).
23. Alaskan and Hawaiian Natives fall outside this description as do tribes whose
adjudicative jurisdiction has been compromised by Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67
Stat. 588-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 and other scattered sections in 18
and 28 U.S.C.), which extends state jurisdiction to many tribal matters.
24. One should not confuse this municipal law doctrine of recognition with the general
international principle, though the historical status of the tribes as entities capable of treating
on the international plane may inform the early development of the municipal recognition
doctrine. On the international doctrine of recognition, see STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
25. Padraic McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality and
Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 421, 431 (2002).
26. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (explaining that the doctrine of
discovery gives the "discovering" European State the sole right to acquire tribal territory
through "purchase or conquest"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (stating
7
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Chief Justice Marshall articulated a view of tribes as distinct independent
political communities with exclusive authority in their territories derived
from their original tribal sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Court found that
the tribes' comparative weakness and dependence upon the United States
required divestiture of external sovereignty: specifically, the tribes' rights
to establish relations with foreign States 27 and to cede lands to any entity
other than the federal government. 28 Though the Court'disagreed with
tribal claims to full independence, the tribes retained internal aspects of
sovereignty to govern themselves and others within their territory. 29
Municipal law today continues to characterize the tribes' powers as
derivative of their sovereign status predating formation of the republic.
Their legislative and enforcement jurisdiction is inherent; it does not
depend upon federal delegation, though the federal government may
delegate additional authority to the tribes.30
Following this deprivation of external sovereignty, Congress and the
courts have steadily eroded tribal powers. 31 The federal common law
doctrine of congressional plenary power over tribes32 permits Congress to
eliminate or reduce tribal powers. The doctrine extends to the point of
termination of the U.S.-tribal relationship 33 (changing a tribe's status from
recognized to unrecognized), although certain tribal powers or immunities
may survive this termination.34 One might infer that this congressional
power over tribal governments makes tribal sovereignty an illusory
doctrine in terms of U.S. municipal law.35 While this may be the case, tribal
governments do exercise significant governmental powers, and the official
that treaties demonstrate tribe is a "state," a distinct political society separated from others
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, but not a foreign state); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 n.2 (1832) (deeming the United States a tribal "protector" in an unequal
alliance, yet noting the tribes retain all internal attributes of sovereignty).
27. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
28. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574.
29. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-563.
30. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that congressional authority over
Indian affairs includes power to delegate federal authority to the tribes, but congressional act
in restoring tribal inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-members was
not a delegation of federal power).
31. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in
the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2
UTAH L. REv. 443,483-517 (2005).
32. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
33. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (Court of Claims
exercising jurisdiction over tribe's claim even though tribe had been terminated by an act of
Congress). Congress has abandoned the termination policy, but still has the authority to
terminate a tribe if it should choose to do so. See Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d
655, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (survival of
terminated tribe's treaty hunting and fishing rights).
35. On the other hand, powerful theoretical arguments against a legitimate source of the
plenary power have been made: See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States,
and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHICAGo L. REV. 671, 687-701 (1989).
[Vol. 9
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federal government policy of self-determination has aided development of
these governmental powers. 36 Federal courts also assert authority to divest
tribal powers pursuant to a common-law doctrine that the tribes occupy a
dependent position in the hierarchy of American sovereigns: federal courts
may thus refuse to recognize tribal powers seen as inconsistent with their
status as dependents of the federal government.
37
C. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The vital component of federal Indian law for purposes of this study is
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Because federal common law
conceptualizes tribes as a sort of sovereign, its sovereign immunity
doctrine extends to them.38 As the Supreme Court said in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, "Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing
the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers." 39 This immunity shields the tribe, tribal agencies, and tribal
officials acting in an official capacity against lawsuits challenging public
acts (jure imperii) or commercial acts (jure gestionis) in federal, state, or tribal
courts. It is the same doctrine that shields foreign States, the federal
government, and state governments from suit. In practice, however, tribal
immunity can be more extensive than that accorded to other governments,
because statutory and judicial limitations restricting immunity do not
generally apply to the tribes. 40 For instance, although the federal and state
governments statutorily waive immunity against tort claims, enabling
individuals injured by governmental officials to seek compensation, many
tribes have not done so. 41 This immunity will be explored in greater detail
36. J. Kalt & J. Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of
Indian Self-Rule, Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs No. 2004-03 (The Harvard Project
on American Indian Economic Development, 2004).
37. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (holding that the exercise of tribal
authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands beyond what is necessary to
protect self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with dependent status
of the tribes); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983) (holding that dependent status means
state may require liquor licenses for sale of liquor for off-premises consumption in tribal
authority).
38. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)
(holding that tribes and tribal officers are immune from actions brought by state for collection
of state taxes).
39. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
40. For a good description of sovereign immunity as it applies to federal and state
governments and the limitations placed on these governments which in certain cases do not
apply to tribes, see John Duffy, Sovereign Immunity, the Officer Suit, and Entitlement Benefits, 56
U. CHICAGO L. REV. 295 (1989).
41. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Tech., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)
(exercising judicial deference to Congress and declining to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
in a juridical setting); Sac and Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (10th Cir. 1995)
(extraterritorial commercial activity does not strip tribe of its sovereign immunity); U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, The Indian Civil Rights Act: A Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil
9
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in the sections that follow.
42
D. Tribal Governmental Powers
Tribes retain legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over their internal
affairs. This jurisdiction includes the power to define their polity,
43 to
create their own form of government, 44 to exclude individuals from their
lands, 45 to make and enforce criminal and civil laws, 46 to levy taxes, 4
7 to
regulate domestic relations,48 and to decide whether to develop natural
resources within their territories.49 Tribal law enforcement officers have
authority to stop and investigate non-Indians on tribal lands for violations
of state or federal law and may detain and transport alleged offenders to
the authorities with adjudicative jurisdiction.50 More fundamentally, the
tribes organize their own governmental and political institutions.
51 Most
model their governments on the United States and create formal branches
with partial separation of powers. 52 Others have retained traditional forms
of government and customary legal systems. Certain pueblos in the
southwest United States, for example, retain traditional governments based
on unwritten customary law, without a formal court structure,53 while the
Rights June 1991 63-67 (1991) [hereinafter Commission Report].
42. For a comprehensive analysis of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, see Andrea
Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal
Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37
TULSA L. REv. 661 (2002).
43. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that a tribe's right to
define its own membership is "central to its existence").
44. Id. at 62-63.
45. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982).
46. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Merrion, 455 U.S. at 159 (holding that tribes retain inherent power of taxation as
essential aspect of sovereignty); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985)
(requiring no federal authorization of tribal taxes).
48. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); Cherokee Nation v.
Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196 (1894).
50. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1991) (holding that tribal law enforcement authorities
have the power to detain and eject those within tribal territory who disturb public order).
51. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62-63 (1978); Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the
Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1343 (1969).
52. Many tribal governments were reconstituted into tripartite forms pursuant to acts of
Congress authorizing tribal governmental reorganization. See Wheeler-Howard Act, June 18,
1934, 48 Stat. 984 (Indian Reorganization Act); Thomas-Rogers Act, June 26,1936, 49 Stat. 1967,
(Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act).
53. BRADFORD MORSE, INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL FOR
CANADA? 11 (1980); 2 NATIONAL AMERIcAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE AND
THE AMERICAN INDIAN: THE INDIAN JUDICIARY AND THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
25, 28 (1974). Over the past few decades, though, the traditional religious courts of some
Pueblos have evolved into independent constitutional judiciaries. See, e.g., Statement on Tribal
Sovereignty before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Oversight Hearing on Tribal Sovereign
Immunity (Apr. 7, 1998) (Statement of R. Bernal, Chairman All Indian Pueblo Council),
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Navajo Nation operates a sophisticated judiciary and has an exhaustive
tribal code, but no written constitution.54
Whether a tribal court possesses jurisdiction over a matter often
depends upon the nature of the claim, the identity of the claimant or
defendant, and where the claim arose. Jurisdiction might lie exclusively in
tribal court, might be shared with a federal court, or might lie exclusively
in a federal court.55 Where concurrent jurisdiction exists, claimants must
exhaust tribal remedies before pursuing a claim in the federal system.
56
Tribal courts retain inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians, but their
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been judicially restricted.
57
In Talton v. Mayes,58 the Supreme Court found that the Bill of Rights
only applies to the federal and state governments. Because tribes were not
subordinate to these governments and were not signatories to the federal
constitution, individuals claiming substantive or procedural violations of
their rights by Indian tribes were left without a federal remedy. Talton, a
non-Indian, had been convicted of the murder of a Cherokee in a Cherokee
Nation court. He challenged his conviction in federal court alleging
violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights, because the Cherokee
grand jury was not a grand jury within the contemplation of the Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected his argument and stated that the
powers of self-government "enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior
to the constitution" and were not bound by constitutional protections of
individual rights. Several subsequent cases extended Talton's holding to
other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
5 9
available at http://indian.senate.gov/1998hrgs/0407_- rb.htm.
54. DAVID E. WILKINS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 101-12 (2003); OFFICE OF NAVAJO
GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT, NAVAJO NATION GOVERNMENT, 15-32 (4th ed., 1998). -
55. See Kevin Meisner, Modern Problems of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 17 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 175 (1992).
56. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
57. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (divesting Indian tribes of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian U.S. citizens, because such jurisdiction would be
inconsistent with their dependent status). However, at least one tribal Supreme Court has
found this decision did not affect its inherent criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals.
"[Tihe sovereign power of inherent jurisdiction of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians to try
and punish non-Indian aliens of the United States has not been expressly terminated by
Treaty, Act of Congress, or specifically prohibited by a binding decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit." Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres (E. Cherokee Apr. 12, 2005) Docket no. CR-03-143 [33]
(holding that tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian foreign nationals is not inconsistent
with status of tribe as a domestic dependent nation); see also Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
v. Chavez CR-03-1039 (E. Cherokee Ct. 2004) (reaching same result with similar facts).
58. 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Constitution does not apply to tribes because their
authority does not derive from the constitution).
59. See, e.g., Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131, 135 (10th Cir. 1959) (holding that the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom
does not apply to regulations passed by Indian nations); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council
v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has "no application to actions of Indian tribes, acting as
such").
11
Cowan: International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
Individuals, whether members or non-members of an American Indian
tribe, who alleged violation of their rights by tribal governments were thus
permitted to seek remedies solely in tribal fora.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act 60 to mitigate the
impact of Talton and its progeny by granting individual rights against
tribal governments similar to those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and
Fourteenth Amendment.61 However, the only remedial provision that
Congress included in the Act was the "privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus" given to any person in a federal court to "test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe." 62 The purpose of the Act was to
ensure that individuals are protected from arbitrary acts by tribal
governments. But the remedies were restricted because the federal
government also wanted to foster tribal self-government and preserve
cultural identity.
63
The Indian Civil Rights Act as interpreted by the Martinez decision
guarantees significant substantive and procedural rights to individuals
60. The rights protecting provisions of the Act, found in 25 U.S.C. § 1302, as amended,
provide that:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall- (1) make
or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; (2) violate the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; (4)
compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense; (7) require excessive bail, impose
excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event
impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or
both; (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process
of law; (9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or (10) deny to
any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
61. This action was taken pursuant to Congress' plenary power to modify or eliminate the
tribes' inherent powers of self-government. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 at 57 ("Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local
self-government which the tribes otherwise possess."); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
379-85 (1886) (recognizing congressional power to make laws which extend into Indian
country and reduce the tribes' authority).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000); see also Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58, 69-71 (rejecting claim
that other provisions of the Act necessarily implied a right to a remedy in federal court).
63. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 507
F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1975).
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against tribal governments, but it places the remedial mechanisms for such
rights in tribal, rather than federal, courts.64 As discussed below in greater
detail, claimants may not assert individual rights against a tribe in federal
court except in the case of habeas relief or where the tribal judiciary has
ruled without subject matter jurisdiction and tribal remedies have been
exhausted.65 The gaps between the Act and the Bill of Rights, Fourteenth
Amendment, and other civil rights legislation (not applicable to tribes) also
leave gaps in the implementation of U.S. international human rights
obligations. The failure of federal enforceability of most of the Act's rights-
protecting provisions means that tribal courts remain the exclusive forum
for allegations of violations of many of these rights.
66
II. TRIBAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
BINDING ON THE UNITED STATES
A. International Human Rights Obligations
Myriad human rights instruments bind the United States under
international law. Those susceptible to tribal violations include the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),67 the
International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment,68  and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 69 Inter-American
jurisprudence demonstrates that the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man (American Declaration)70 also binds the United States
64. Proposals to give federal court jurisdiction to hear complaints under the Act have been
introduced in Congress. For instance, Senate Bill 517, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), would
have permitted individuals to enter federal court upon a showing that the tribal court failed to
be independent or failed to provide certain procedures. See Judith Resnik, Multiple
Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Government, 79 JUDICATURE 118, 125 n.71
(1995).
65. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (holding
that claims challenging a tribal court's jurisdiction cannot be brought in federal district court
until tribal remedies have been exhausted); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18-20
(1987) (requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged
in a diversity case and noting that the Indian Civil Rights Act protects non-Indian individuals
against unfair treatment in tribal courts).
66. This is not to suggest that tribal courts are not effective or capable protectors of
individual rights. Every legal system has the potential to violate individual rights. For a
careful study of several civil rights cases heard in tribal courts, see Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 341-
53 (1998).
67. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
68. International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter CAT].
69. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter CERD].
70. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, International
13
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under international law.71 Further, tribal law enforcement officials could
potentially breach Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. 72 The United States is legally obligated to adopt such laws or
other measures as may be required to give effect to the substantive rights
recognized in these documents.
B. U.S. Implementation of its Human Rights Obligations
1. Self-Execution Doctrine
When the Senate ratifies an international human rights convention, it
typically enters reservations, declarations, and understandings, which
often attempt to restrict U.S. international obligations to the extent they
differ from U.S. municipal law.73 Municipal law governs whether statutory
implementation is necessary for these instruments and whether judicial
enforceability is available. If the Senate declares a treaty non-self-
Conference of American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L./V./I.4 rev. (1948), reprinted
in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 5 (1978) and in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser/L/V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev. 1
(1992) 17 [hereinafter American Declaration].
71. See, e.g., Baby Boy Case (United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Resolution 23/81 13-17
(1981) (holding that international obligations of the United States are governed by the OAS
Charter; that through the Charter the American Declaration and other human rights
instruments gained binding force; and that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
as the regional organ entrusted with competence to promote human rights has competence to
decide whether the United States has violated its obligations under the American
Declaration); Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9467, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
3/87 46-49 (1987) (holding that jus cogens norms, binding on the United States, prohibits
execution of children and that the United States was in violation of its obligations under
American Declaration as interpreted in light of jus cogens norm); Interpretation of the
American Declaration within the Framework of the ACHR, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89, A/10 35-45 (1989) (holding that the American Declaration is for OAS
member States a source of international obligations); Haitian Interdiction (United States), Case
10. 675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96, at n.35 (1997) (holding that for OAS member
states the Declaration is the text that defines the human rights referred to in the Charter; that
Articles 1(2)(b) and 20 of the Commission's Statute define the competence of that body with
respect to the human rights enunciated in the Declaration; and that, therefore, the American
Declaration is for the United States a source of international obligations related to the OAS
Charter). See also Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human
Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1975); Douglass, Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law: Soft
and Hard Law, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 393-418 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
72. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (April 24,1963).
73. Only reservations alter a State's responsibility under an international convention, but
there may be a question as to whether a particular submission constitutes a reservation or
declaration. Reservations operate to exclude a treaty body from exercising its quasi-judicial
authority under a human rights treaty. Reservations are permissible so long as the treaty
contains no provision to the contrary and they are not "incompatible with the object and the
purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Other States parties may, of course, file objections to
reservations.
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executing, as it has done for each of the human rights conventions
discussed herein, the treaty provisions create no private cause of action and
can only be enforced when implemented through federal legislation. 74 For
example, while the ICCPR, CERD, and CAT, bind the United States under
international law, several federal courts have found that they are not self-
executing and are therefore not subject to judicial enforcement. 75 The
United States believes its commitment to comply with these conventions
requires no implementing legislation because pre-existing federal, state,
and local laws provide sufficient and equivalent protection to individuals.
As a legal advisor to the State Department testified before a Senate hearing
on whether to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination: "As was the case with the earlier [human
rights] treaties, existing U.S. law provides extensive protection and
remedies.... There is thus no need for the establishment of additional
causes of action to enforce the requirements of the convention." 76 While
this may be true with regard to federal and state governments, it is not true
with regard to tribal governments.
2. Municipal Enforcement of International Obligations Against Tribal
Governments
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, among other
constitutional and statutory provisions, provide broad protection for
individual rights that are enforceable in federal and state courts. Most
international human rights provisions that bind the United States find
expression through the implementation of these municipal laws. Judicial
decisions and federal civil rights legislation have created remedies for their
violation by government officers.77 Yet these enforcement mechanisms are
74. David Weissbrodt, et al., International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process 687-89 (3d
ed. 2001); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) § 312 cmt.
h.
75. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875-77 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Choctaw Nation
of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (holding that the Court may look
beyond written words of a treaty in determining whether it is self-executing). Factors a court
may use in determining whether a treaty is self-executing include the purposes and objectives
of the States parties, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for
direct implementation, availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms, and
immediate and long-range consequences of self and non-self-execution. See, e.g., People of
Saipan v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
76. Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conrad Harper, Legal Advisor to the
State Department, 5 DISPATCH MAG. 22 (May 11 1994); Weissbrodt et al., supra note 74, at 689.
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (authorizing damage actions where state officials violate
individual rights); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-680; Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1994) (authorizing damage actions against federal government);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980)
("a damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for
vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees").
15
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inapplicable to tribal governmenits, creating a gap between municipal law
and international human rights obligations of the United States.
Congress's singular attempt to implement human rights protections
against the tribes, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,78 contains provisions
analogous to those found in the Bill of Rights and provides the only
protection (apart from tribal law) for Indians and non-Indians alike against
potential tribal violations of U.S. international human rights obligations.
Though it became law before U.S. accession to any human rights
conventions, the Act reflects several convention provisions. Still, it does
not reflect them all, and this is important.
A juxtaposition of the Indian Civil Rights Act and U.S. international
human rights obligations reveals substantive discrepancies. For example,
article 14 of the ICCPR requires that indigent criminal defendants be
provided legal assistance "in any case where the interests of justice so
require." 79 With regard to Article 14(3), the United Nations Human Rights
Committee has held that States must provide legal assistance to the poor at
all stages of criminal proceedings.8 0 Even without the convention, the
United States implements this provision through the Constitution's due
process clauses, which require the states and federal government to
provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants facing confinement.81
Thus, the United States has declared that its municipal law sufficiently
implements the ICCPR:
[Tihe United States understands that [article 14(3)] do[es] not
require the provision of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice
when the defendant is provided with court-appointed counsel on
grounds of indigence, when the defendant is financially able to
retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment is not imposed.82
Contrary to the assumptions in this reservation, the Indian Civil Rights
Act fails to achieve implementation against tribal governments because it
does not require legal assistance under any circumstance. Tribes can
78. 25 U.S.C §§ 1301-41 (2000).
79. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 14(3)(d).
80. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Borisenko v. Hungary, 7.5, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/76/D/852/1999 (2002) ("it is incumbent upon the State party to ensure that legal
representation provided by the State guarantees effective representation... legal assistance
should be available at all stages of criminal proceedings").
81. Compare Argersinger v. Hamelin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) with Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d
1101, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that persons subject to imprisonment by tribal courts are
not entitled to attorney).
82. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) United States "Reservations,
Understandings, Declarations, and Proviso" upon ratification of the ICCPR [hereinafter
Reservations]. The Human Rights Committee also views failure to provide competent counsel
to indigent criminal defendants violative of the provision. U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Concluding Observations: United States, 266-304, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.50, 288
[hereinafter Concluding Observations].
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prosecute and sentence destitute defendants to one year's imprisonment
and a $5,000 fine without providing legal assistance of any kind.
8 3 The
tribes may choose to provide legal assistance, but federal law does not
require them to do so. This is just one example of numerous substantive
gaps between the Indian Civil Rights Act and U.S. international
obligations.84
Domestic acceptance of duplicative tribal-federal criminal prosecutions
may be another gap in implementation. In United States v. Lara,
85 the
Supreme Court considered the application of double jeopardy to dual
tribal-federal prosecutions. The case involved a non-member Indian who
assaulted a federal officer during an arrest for violation of a tribal exclusion
order.86 The defendant pled guilty to the tribal crime of "violence against a
policeman" and served ninety days in prison. The federal government
subsequently prosecuted him for assaulting a federal official. Because key
elements of the tribal and federal crimes were identical, the second
prosecution would normally be abandoned to avoid double jeopardy.
However, the Court found the offenses to be distinct crimes against
separate sovereigns and upheld the federal conviction.
8 7
Article 14(7) of the ICCPR provides that "[nlo one shall be liable to be
tried or punished again for an offense for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted."8 8  Meanwhile, municipal law treats parallel
prosecutions by the state, tribal, and federal governments as offenses
against separate sovereigns not barred by the U.S. Constitution's Double
Jeopardy Clause.89  The U.S. reservation to Article 14(7) restricts its
application to existing municipal law as to the federal government and its
"constituent units."90 Since the tribes are not constituent units of the
federal system, dual tribal-federal prosecutions for the same offense breach
criminal defendants' Article 14(7) rights.
83. Indian Civil Rights Act § 1302(7) (2000). Should a tribe exceed these penalties, the
defendant may challenge his or her detention under the habeas review provision after
exhausting tribal remedies. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000). Though this mechanism bounds tribal
justice systems with federal review in certain instances, the gap in implementation of U.S.
human rights obligations remains.
84. Other gaps include the absence of a right to vote, a right to participate in government, a
right to review by a higher tribunal, and a right to privacy. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). Such
gaps result in violations of specific U.S. international obligations because of the U.S. failure to
include the tribes within its reservations or to implement these obligations against tribal
governments.
85. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 14(7).
89. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (holding that states are separate sovereigns for
purposes of the double jeopardy clause); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197 (2004); United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (noting that offense against separate sovereigns does
not trigger double jeopardy protection).
90. Reservations, supra note 82. On tribes not being constituent units, see for example Toledo
v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429, 432 (D.N.M. 1954).
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Even where an Indian Civil Rights Act provision reproduces verbatim a
constitutional right, tribal interests can justify conflicting treatment under
the statute and its federal constitutional predecessors. 91 Courts have
"correctly sensed that Congress [in passing the Act] did not intend...
[constitutional principles to] disrupt settled tribal customs and
traditions."92 Essentially, although the Indian Civil Rights Act protections
may mirror 'certain constitutional rights, the substantive meaning of these
guarantees under tribal governments will diverge from their meaning
under state and federal governments. Moreover, because many
international human rights obligations find enforcement through U.S.
constitutional rights, the Indian Civil Rights Act provisions may develop
meanings unreflective of U.S. international human rights obligations even
where the Act's provisions superficially correspond to U.S. constitutional
rights.
93
3. Analysis of a Self-Executing Treaty with Individual Rights
Protections
Municipal practice might fail sufficiently to reflect U.S. international
obligations even where a treaty is self-executing. For instance, the United
States consistently fails to enforce its consular relations obligations against
U.S. states and consequently has been haled before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) several times for state violations of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, which requires that an arrested foreign
national be notified of his or her right to communicate with his or her
consulate and that the consulate be notified upon detainment of a
national. 94 While federalism concerns and the doctrine of procedural
default have prevented domestic enforcement of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations against U.S. states, potential tribal violations remain
91. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding that rights found in the Indian Civil Rights Act are not coextensive with similar
rights in the United States constitution). But see Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841
F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that where tribal procedures are identical to those found
in Anglo societies, federal constitutional standards may be employed).
92. Id. (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 670 (1982 ed.)); see also
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 436 U.S. 49, 62-72 (1978) (holding that Congress did not intend
the ICRA to incorpoarate process principles which disrupt tribal customs).
93. It must be noted that the United States ostensibly has implemented against tribal
governments the preemptory norm of international law prohibiting slavery. The Thirteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which bans slavery, applies not only to
governmental units of federated entities, but to private actors as well. See, e.g., In re Sah Quah,
31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886) (ordering release of an Indian held in slavery according to tribal
custom).
94. See, e.g., LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of June 27); Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31). In both cases the
ICJ found the United States responsible for violations of the Vienna Convention where states
had failed to follow its requirements.
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unexamined.
Federal Indian law scholars and courts assert that the U.S. Supreme
Court eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe.95 This holding appears to prevent tribes from
breaching Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
96
Yet there are four areas in which tribes exercise authority, or have some
potential to exercise authority, to assert law enforcement jurisdiction over
foreign nationals. First, the membership of some border tribes can include
Mexican or Canadian nationals.97 U.S. municipal law identifies members
of recognized tribes as Indians and thus potentially subjects these foreign
nationals to tribal criminal jurisdiction.98 Secondly, though the Court in
Oliphant spoke of "non-Indians," its reasoning applies only to non-Indians
who are also U.S. citizens. The Eastern Cherokee Supreme Court in Eastern
Cherokee Band of Indians v. Torres exposed this flaw and found that it retains
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian aliens.99 Thirdly, tribal
power to exclude individuals from tribal lands includes a power to detain
and remove.100 Finally, tribal courts potentially retain criminal contempt
power over non-Indians.1 0' Considering these potential tribal breaches of
95. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For an example of a scholarly work proceeding from an assumption
that tribes no longer possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, see William Vetter, A New
Corridor for the Maze: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction and Nonmember Indians, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
349 (1992).
96. Joseph Kalt & Joseph Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and
Economics of Indian Self-Rule 17 n.35 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs No. 2004-05)
("Tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians whatsoever.").
97. For example, approximately 8,400 Tohono O'odham members are Mexican nationals.
Carmen Duarte, Tohono O'odham: Campaign for Citizenship, Nation Divided, ARIZONA DAILY
STAR, May 31, 2001, at Al; see also Megan S. Austin, A Culture Divided by the United States-
Mexican Border: The Tohono O'odham Claim for Border Crossing Rights, 8 ARIZONA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 97 (1991).
98. See, e.g., LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
definition of an Indian for criminal jurisdiction purposes requires enrollment or affiliation
with a federally recognized tribe).
99. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres (E. Cherokee Apr. 12, 2005) Docket No. CR-
03-143, 23-25, 28-32 ("In Oliphant, all the authority relied upon (treaties, opinions and
statutes) sought to protect the liberty of United States citizens from Indians. The Court was
not concerned with the protection of aliens in dealing with Indians. Nor has the United States
Supreme Court specifically expressed the protection of aliens as a reason to limit the
sovereignty of Indian tribes").
100. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990) ("Tribal law enforcement authorities
have the power to restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if necessary,
to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal
officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper
authorities."). Tribes may also retain the power to arrest non-Indians for purposes of
extradition to the proper jurisdiction or to remove them from tribal lands pursuant to the
exclusion power. See, e.g., Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1975)
("The power of the Papago to exclude non-Indian state and federal law violators from the
reservation would be meaningless were the tribal police not empowered to investigate such
violations. Obviously, tribal police must have such power.").
101. Oliphant did not address the criminal contempt power of tribal courts, and the tribes
seem to have at least contemplated the exercise of this power. See, e.g., Cherokee Code
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U.S. consular obligations, congressional plenary power over the tribes frees
the United States from the federalism concerns evident in LaGrand,10 2 and
permits Congress to implement the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations against them.
C. The Potential for Tribal Violations of U.S. International Human
Rights Obligations
1. Parallel Case Study
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez'0 3 provides a pellucid illustration of tribal
governments' capacity to breach international human rights obligations of
the United States. Despite arising prior to U.S. accession to the
international human rights covenants, the facts of the case could certainly
reappear in a similar case today. Indeed, the tribal law which gave rise to
the litigation is still in force. 104 As discussed below, an analogous decision
by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, Lovelace v. Canada,10 5 can be used to
test the assertion that the law at issue in Martinez, or similar tribal laws,
breach provisions of the ICCPR.
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
Julia Martinez, a full-blood member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, married
a full-blood member of the Navajo Nation in 1941. The couple had
children and raised them within Pueblo jurisdiction as tribal members.
The children were included in the cultural and spiritual life of the tribe and
spoke the Santa Claran language, Tewa. 106 Despite their clear genetic and
cultural affinity with the Pueblo, the Pueblo government denied the
children tribal membership on the basis of a tribal law which forbade
children of Santa Claran mothers and non-Santa Claran fathers to gain
membership. The law conversely permitted children of Santa Claran
fathers and non-Santa Claran mothers to become tribal members. 07
(Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians) §§ 1-20 to 1-25 (2001) (making no distinction between
Indians and non-Indians for application of criminal contempt proceedings); White Mountain
Apache Judicial Code §§ 1-1(K), 2-20(D) (1998) (contemplating exercise of criminal contempt
power over non-Indians with punishments including imprisonment).
102. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of June 27) (holding it to be
outside federal competence to interfere in state criminal procedure law).
103. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
104. Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 103, 114 (2004) (noting that the movement within the Pueblo to change the membership
ordinance has not yet succeeded).
105. Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R 6/24, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Supp.
No. 40,166, at 11 (1981).
106. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54 n.5 (1978).
107. Id. at 52 n.2. The law, enacted by the Santa Clara Pueblo Council, establishes these
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Because their father was a non-member, the Martinez children could
not acquire citizenship in the political community with which they
identified most closely. In the ensuing litigation, the Pueblo did not contest
the law's discriminatory nature, but rather asserted that it represented the
tribe's patriarchal cultural heritage.10 8 Martinez sued the Pueblo and
Pueblo Governor in federal court to overturn the discriminatory statute as
a violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act equal protection clause.
10 9 In a
seminal decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Act did not
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and created no federal cause of action
(other than a habeas corpus remedy, inapplicable to the case). Although
the Court explained that the tribal court is the appropriate forum in which
to assert violations of the Act, a tribal court will not necessarily entertain a
suit against the tribe, or a tribal official, unless tribal sovereign immunity
has been waived, whether by tribal common law or by tribal statute. The
Indian Civil Rights Act thus becomes an illusory implementation of U.S.
international human rights obligations.110
A similar federal or state law would have been struck down as a
violation of equal protection,' but since the tribes are not constituent
entities of the union, tribal laws cannot violate such constitutional
protections." 2  Yet aside from breaching established constitutional
standards, the discriminatory Pueblo membership law violates several
international human rights provisions that bind the United States. It
therefore breaches U.S. international obligations and, if attributable to the
United States, should result in U.S. international responsibility.
113
The Pueblo statute at issue in Martinez violates international human
rights obligations of non-discrimination, equal protection, and effective
membership rules:
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo. 2.... [C]hildren born
of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo. 3. Children born of
marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo. 4. Persons shall
not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo under any
circumstances.
108. Brief for National Tribal Chairmen's Association as Amicus Curiae, Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (No. 76-682) (quoting the Pueblo
Governor as saying that the law represented the only way for the Pueblo to protect
and preserve its heritage), cited in Berger, supra note 104.
109. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 54-55.
110. See Dubray v. Rosebud Housing Authority, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6015 (Rosebud Sioux
Tribal Ct 1985) (ruling that defendant tribal agency had not waived sovereign immunity after
federal court had dismissed plaintiffs claim on basis that tribal court was appropriate forum).
111. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating a state law which discriminated
between parental rights based on gender of the parent).
112. While Congress applied certain rights protecting provisions to the tribes in the Indian
Civil Rights Act, suits against the tribe under the Act are barred. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S. at 72.
113. See Articles, supra note 7, at 80-109.
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remedy under the ICCPR and the American Declaration. The tribal gender
discrimination at issue in Martinez also gives rise to additional violations of
individual rights guaranteed by the ICCPR, most prominently the denial to
Martinez's children of the individual right to partake in minority culture
(Article 27)114 and perhaps the right to take part in government (Article 25).
The Martinez children lost all benefits of tribal membership and faced
several other hardships. Under the Pueblo law, when their mother died,
they were ineligible to inherit her property, to use Pueblo property, or to
remain on Pueblo lands. As non-members they were ineligible to
participate in tribal government and could be excluded from access to their
culture, language, and religion.
3. Lovelace v. Canada
The petitioner in Lovelace v. Canada"15 challenged a law very similar to
the Pueblo law at issue in Martinez. Lovelace, a Maliseet Indian in Canada,
lost her tribal membership upon her 1970 marriage to a non-Indian. The
Indian Act, a Canadian federal law, terminated the tribal membership of
Indian women who marry non-Indians but permitted male Indians who
intermarry to retain membership.11 6 It also made Lovelace's children
ineligible for membership. In Lovelace, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
recognized that the Indian Act "entails serious disadvantages on the part of
the Indian woman who wants to marry a non-Indian man.. ."117 These
disadvantages were similar to those found in Martinez and included loss of
the right to reside or possess lands within the reserve, to inherit possessory
interests in reserve land, or to be buried on tribal land. Loss of Indian
status also resulted in a divestment of the powers to exercise Indian
hunting and fishing rights and to partake in tribal culture and religion."8
The Human Rights Committee did not find Canada responsible for a
breach of the ICCPR non-discrimination provisions, but only because the
Convention did not enter into force against Canada until six years after the
marriage.1 9 Nevertheless, the Committee found Lovelace's continuing loss
of cultural benefits breached Canada's Article 27 obligations under the
ICCPR to guarantee the right of minorities to participate in culture,
114. Article 27 of the Covenant states: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language." ICCPR, supra note 67. The tribes'
status in municipal law and powers to define membership and to exclude, uniquely positions
them to violate this United States international obligation to protect individual access to
minority culture, religion, and linguistic community.
115. Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R 6/24, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Supp.
No. 40, 166 (1981).
116. Id. 1.
117. Id. 7.2.
118. Id. 9.8-17.
119. Id. at 10-12.
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language, and religion in community with other group members. Canada
has since revised the Indian Act to eliminate gender discrimination and to
permit children of women who intermarry to retain tribal membership, but
the Human Rights Committee has expressed concern over continuing
exclusion of subsequent generations.120
4. Comparison of the Lovelace and Martinez Holdings
Whereas Canada's discriminatory Indian Act at issue in Lovelace was a
federal law, the analogous law at issue in Martinez was a tribal ordinance.
Each law deprived minority individuals of their right to partake in culture
and religion as protected by international obligations undertaken by the
respective host States (Canada and the United States). The laws also had
significant effects on property rights and rights of participation in the tribal
political community. Lovelace substantiates the contention that the Pueblo
ordinance violates ICCPR provisions which bind the United States under
international law. As the Human Rights Committee articulated in Lovelace,
the Article 27 right of access to minority culture protects those "brought up
on a reserve, who have kept ties with their community and wish to
maintain these ties. .. "121 This sphere of protection would surely
encompass the Martinez children. These cases demonstrate that the
American Indian tribes, even through an exercise of their governmental
powers valid under U.S. law, may engage in conduct that violates U.S.
international human rights obligations.
5. Other Examples of Tribal Governmental Capacity to Breach U.S.
International Obligations
In addition, the traditional tribal punishment of banishment may
breach international human rights norms, such as the formulation of
individual rights of access to minority culture in Article 27 of the ICCPR or
the right to participate in one's government under the CERD.'2
Banishment involves expulsion of a member and deprivation of his or her
rights to vote, to participate in tribal government, to take part in the tribe's
religious and cultural life, to inherit property, to receive tribal payments
and social assistance, and to use tribal lands. Banished members have
alleged that their tribe imposed the punishment for improper reasons, such
as their race or political views.123 In Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
120. Human Rights Committee, Apr. 7, 1999, Concluding Observations: Canada, 19, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105.
121. Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R 6/24, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Supp.
No. 40, 166, at 14 (1981).
122. CERD, supra note 69, art. 5.
123. See, e.g., Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton, 223 F.Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2002)
(involving Seminole Nation's exclusion of Seminoles of African-American descent from
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Indians,124 for instance, claimants alleged that the tribe convicted them in
absentia of treason, on the basis of "actions to overthrow... the traditional
government of the Tonawanda Band of Seneca Nation," and banished
them. Although the Poodry court indicated in dicta that the Indian Civil
Rights Act implicitly proscribes banishment, no other cases support this
view.'25 The Human Rights Committee has defined minority membership
as "objective," and it has been suggested that Article 27 not only prevents
States from defining minority group membership, but also prevents
minority groups themselves from conclusively defining their own
membership where such definition denies access to collective attributes
protected by the article.1 26
Federal and tribal case reports reveal several examples of tribal
conduct that arguably breaches U.S. international obligations, even within
the limited body of federal jurisprudence under the Indian Civil Rights
Act. Tribes have prevented members of African descent from voting or
participating in government based on their race,1 27 in apparent violation of
the CERD.128 Traditional Pueblos have reportedly attempted to limit
members' religious freedom. 129  Claimants have alleged free speech
violations, arbitrary detention and seizure of property, and conduct
arguably within the definition of cruel or degrading treatment.130
voting in tribal election).
124. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 889 (2d Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 895-98.
126. Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 5 (stating that a Sami decision to deny membership, for
purposes of a national law governing herding rights, to an individual already permitted to
herd, did not constitute a breach of Article 27 of the ICCPR); Human Rights Committee, Aug.
4, 1994, General Comment 23: The Rights of Minorities, 5.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5; SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 755-56 (2d ed. 2004).
127. The Convention proscribes racial discrimination in the context of civil and political
rights. CERD, supra note 69, art. 5.
128. Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1989) (involving
plaintiffs who were denied their right to participate in tribal elections or tribal government,
and their right to tribal services, based on race); Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton, 223
F.Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2002); Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving
plaintiffs who were systematically denied their right to participate in tribal government and
right to tribal services, based on race); CERD, supra note 69, art. 5 (providing a right to
participate in political community regardless of race). To the extent these cases involve denial
of access to tribal cultural events or religious observances, they may also violate the economic
and social provisions of the Convention, such as the right to partake in cultural activities.
129. F. Svensson, Liberal Democracy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and Its
Impact on American Indian Tribes, 27 POL. STUD. 3 (1979) (traditional religious governments
allegedly sought to quell tribal member's growing interest in Christianity). It should be
remembered that the Indian Civil Rights Act contains no free expression or antiestablishment
clause. Thus, even if a tribe has waived its sovereign immunity defence for alleged Indian
Civil Rights Act violations, no standing exists for religious freedom based cases.
130. Choctaws for Democracy v. Choctaw Council, 5 Okla. Trib. 165 (Choctaw Tribal Ct.
1996) (regulation on the distribution of certain literature); Rorex v. Cherokee Nation, 6 Okla.
Trib. 239, 241 (Cherokee J.A.T. 1995) (addressing wrongful expropriation of private property);
Kennedy v. Hughes, 60 Fed. Appx. 734 (10th Cir. 2003) (unreported) (addressing seizure of
property); Linneen v. Gila River Indian Community, 276 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing
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Conditions in tribal prisons are routinely cited as among the worst in the
United States.131 The Human Rights Committee has commented on
conditions in U.S. prisons but has not specifically considered tribal
detention facilities.13 2 These cases illustrate the lacuna between U.S.
international human rights obligations and municipal implementation
against tribal governments.
III. DOMESTIC REMEDIES FOR TRIBAL VIOLATIONS
A. Access to Courts
Whereas the few substantive gaps in implementation of international
obligations against the tribes may seem trivial, Martinez gave rise to a
deeper flaw in implementation. As previously mentioned, the Court found
that the Indian Civil Rights Act - the only federal legislation that obligates
tribes to protect individual human rights and derivatively provides human
rights protections -- permits no federal judicial review of tribal violations
other than habeas corpus review for ongoing wrongful detention.133 Thus,
an allegation of a tribal human rights violation must be resolved in tribal
court, although the Indian Civil Rights Act does not even require the
creation of a formal court structure, and tribal courts may find Indian Civil
Rights Act claims barred by the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine. 134
Under federal law, tribal courts are technically bound to enforce the Indian
Civil Rights Act's provisions. However, federal courts cannot review tribal
court decisions, so no guarantee exists that the tribe will enforce the Indian
Civil Rights Act or, by extension, U.S. international human rights
obligations. This is the procedural gap in implementation: individuals
have no domestic forum capable of enforcing certain human rights
provisions guaranteed in the U.N. Conventions and American Declaration
against the tribes.
The Martinez Court also held that the Indian Civil Rights Act creates no
private cause of action in federal courts for equitable (declaratory or
injunctive) relief against tribal officials and refused to imply congressional
intent to create such an action. It reasoned that to do so would undermine
the authority of tribal courts and would be contrary to the congressional
intention to protect tribal self-government. This decision stands in sharp
arbitrary detention and degrading treatment).
131. See, e.g., 2003 U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE JAILS IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2005); 2002 U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE JAILS IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2003).
132. Concluding Observations, supra note 82, at 285 (expressing concern "about conditions of
detention of persons deprived of liberty in federal or state prisons"). HRC General Comment
21 clarifies that States bear responsibility for all prisons within their territory. Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 21 (Forty-fourth Session, 1992), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7,
at 153.
133. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000).
134. Commission Report, supra note 41, at 63-67.
25
Cowan: International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
contrast to the Court's jurisprudence interpreting civil rights legislation
against the states and federal government. 135 In these contexts it regularly
infers federal causes of action to promote enforcement of civil rights laws.
Yet in the tribal context, the tribes' status as separate political communities
and the national policy of tribal independence prevents implied causes of
action. The Court explained its reluctance to imply federal judicial review,
"[W]e have... recognized that the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations
which, by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in
many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and
[s]tate governments." 1
36
The Martinez judgment also shows that courts treat tribal laws
inconsistent with international human rights obligations differently from
similarly inconsistent state laws. Where potential conflict arises between a
state or local law and a treaty, U.S. courts may interpret the law as
consistent with U.S. international obligations. 137 This mechanism prevents
invocation of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause to declare state law or
local law invalid. Even non-self-executing treaties, such as the human
rights conventions, may supersede state law or policy. 138 This mechanism
fails in the tribal context because federal courts often lack jurisdiction to
review tribal laws that may conflict with U.S. international human rights
obligations.
Linneen v. Gila River Indian Community, a case from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, exemplifies the lack of federal court jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims by those alleging tribal human rights violations. The
non-Indian claimants alleged violations amounting to arbitrary detention
and degrading treatment. 139 Although the non-Indian claimants in Linneen
happen to have been U.S. nationals, foreign nationals could find
themselves similarly mistreated by tribal law enforcement officials
exercising, for example, the tribal right of exclusion or investigation, which
could create an international dispute for reparations for injuries to aliens.
Claimants asserted, inter alia, false imprisonment and unreasonable search
and seizure claims against the tribe and a tribal law enforcement officer.
135. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978).
136. Id. at 71.
137. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924)
(striking down ordinance inconsistent with U.S.-Japan treaty). United States courts tend to
interpret acts of Congress as consistent with earlier treaties whether the treaties are self-
executing or non-self-executing, because the treaties are binding under international law and
upholding an inconsistent statute could place the United States in breach of its international
obligations. State or local laws may be preempted by self-executing treaties or interpreted so
as not to conflict with international treaties which create binding obligations upon the United
States. A non-self-executing treaty would not supersede inconsistent state or local law, but if
the courts cannot interpret the state or local law as consistent with U.S. international
obligations it would be struck down as a violation of the federal government's delegated
authority over foreign affairs.
138. For discussion of state and local law in the context of non-self-executing treaties, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 115 cmt. e (1987).
139. Linneen v. Gila River Indian Community, 276 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2002).
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They sought compensation under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which
provides compensation for violations of constitutional rights caused by
those acting under color of law. Yet the Linneen court dismissed the claims,
holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act creates no federal cause of action
and neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Civil Rights Act applies to tribes.
Tribal sovereign immunity shielded the officer himself from claims for
damages and prevented the claimants bringing an action against the tribe
or tribal officer in tribal court. Clearly, the tribe's failure to waive
immunity denied the claimants an effective remedy.
The expansive protection afforded tribal officials through the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine raises questions of the efficacy of the rule of
law in tribal legal systems.140 The lacuna of coverage of international
human rights law in this instance goes unaddressed in legal commentary.
Professor Shelton, for example, asserts that the U.S. Supreme Court "has
affirmed that the right of access to the courts 'assures that no person will be
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning
violations of fundamental constitutional rights,' such as those recognized
in the Civil Rights Act of 1871."141 This conclusion is incorrect in situations
of tribal human rights violations. The Indian Civil Rights Act itself
purports to protect individual human rights against violations by tribal
governments but creates limited access to federal courts and questionable
access to tribal courts.142 Tribal sovereign immunity can prevent such
access and consequently violate the U.S. international obligation to ensure
the availability of effective remedies.
143
B. Substantive Remedies
Even without full implementation of human rights treaties, other
common law and statutory mechanisms exist to ensure that individuals
alleging human rights violations against federal and state governments
have access to tribunals with power to fashion remedies. However, these
same mechanisms generally do not provide remedies for tribal violations
of individual human rights.
The Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, and various international claims tribunals have found
compensation to be an appropriate remedy for arbitrary deprivations of
liberty such as that alleged in Linneen.144 For instance, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee has found that where a State violates Article 9 or 14 of
the ICCPR it must compensate the victim and "undertake to investigate the
140. Commission Report, supra note 41, at 65.
141. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 66 (2000).
142. As discussed above, the only access to federal courts is the habeas corpus remedy
provided in 25 U.S.C. § 1303 for wrongful detention. Tribal remedies must first be exhausted.
143. E.g. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 3(b).
144. SHELTON, supra note 141, at 118-20.
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facts, take appropriate actions, and bring to justice those found responsible
for the violations." 145 A United States reservation to the ICCPR establishes
that the United States "understands the right to compensation.., to
require the provision of effective and enforceable mechanisms by which a
victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a miscarriage of justice may
seek and, where justified, obtain compensation from either the responsible
individual or the appropriate governmental entity."1
46
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that compensation
"[from] the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for
vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees." 147 The Court established
the common law mechanism for provision of compensation where federal
officials violate individual rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents. 148
Bivens actions do not extend to state or tribal officers, but Congress
statutorily enabled claims for compensation against state officials. 49
Professor Shelton views this legislation as an extension of the
compensation remedy to "other levels of government."150 The legislation,
however, does not extend to tribal officials. U.S. municipal law permits no
claims for compensation against tribal law enforcement officers acting in an
official capacity unless the tribe itself has waived tribal sovereign
immunity. 151 Appropriate compensation awarded by domestic tribunals
can discharge a State's responsibility for violations of its international
obligations, such as its duty not to engage in arbitrary detention and
inhuman treatment. 152 However, for violations by officials of tribes that
have not waived immunity from suit in individual rights, federal courts
claim no authority to provide compensation, and the State's responsibility
for violation of its international obligations cannot be discharged.
Unlike compensatory relief, equitable remedies are generally available
against government officials in the United States to rectify ongoing or
imminent governmental violations of individual rights.1 53 Under U.S. law,
tribal sovereign immunity does not protect tribal officials from suit for
equitable relief, but the U.S. Supreme Court refused to find an implied
federal cause of action for equitable relief against the tribe or tribal officers
in the Indian Civil Rights Act: 54
145. Id. at 15-16. For an example of a Human Rights Committee statement on the
requirement of compensation for arbitrary detention, see Human Rights Committee,
Concluding Observations: Uganda U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/UGA/2003 1 (2004) par. 17.
146. Reservations, supra note 82, understanding 2.
147. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980).
148. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
149. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2000).
150. SHELTON, supra note 141, at 67.
151. Commission Report, supra note 41, at 63.
152. SHELTON, supra note 141, at 107
153. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
154. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72 (1978); David Sloss, Ex Parte Young
and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH. L.R. 1103 (2000).
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[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the
additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such
actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to
find that [the Indian Civil Rights Act] does not impliedly authorize
actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or
its officers.
155
Further, complications arise under tribal law where the tribe has not
waived its immunity from suit in civil rights actions, and tribal courts may
thus refuse to adjudicate claims for equitable relief.156  The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights has expressed concern that:
The barring of all suits against a tribal government without its
consent, particularly suits for injunctive or equitable relief under a
statute such as the [Indian Civil Rights Act] providing rights
against the tribal government, can leave the plaintiff with a feeling
of frustration, and often leaves the victim without an impartial
tribal forum in which to seek redress under the ICRA or the tribe's
own civil rights laws.
157
Not only does this failure to provide effective remedies make the plaintiff
feel frustrated, it also results in a violation of the U.S. international
obligation to provide an effective remedy to those whose human rights
tribes may have violated.
While federal remedies are generally unavailable, some tribes do
enable their courts to fashion effective remedies. In a claim brought by
prisoners under the Indian Civil Rights Act's cruel and unusual
punishment clause, for instance, the Colville tribal court found official
immunity for equitable relief waived and closed the tribal prison until
improvements were made.158 Had tribal prison conditions been severe
enough and tribal remedies unavailable, the prisoners may have
successfully petitioned a federal court for the writ of habeas corpus, the
sole federal remedy available for tribal human rights violations. Congress
gave federal courts jurisdiction to issue this "great writ of liberty" in the
Indian Civil Rights Act.159 The Act permits a federal judge to protect
individuals against arbitrary or wrongful confinement by an American
Indian tribe.
155. Martinez, 436 U.S., at 71-72.
156. Dubray v. Rosebud Housing Authority, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6015 (Roseland Seoux Tribal
Ct. 1985); Garman v. Fort Belknap Corn. Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. 6017 (Ft. Belknap Tribal Ct.
1984) (holding that the fact that tribal legislative body had not waived tribal sovereign
immunity "is an act of tribal self-government that this court cannot ignore").
157. Commission Report, supra note 41, at 64-65.
158. In re Colville Tribal Jail, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6021 (Colville Ct. Appeal 1986).
159. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000) (providing that any person may test the
"legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe").
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A petition for a writ of habeas corpus against tribal detention requires:
exhaustion of tribal remedies; a severe restraint of individual liberty; and a
violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act's substantive provisions.
160
Exhaustion of tribal remedies typically entails an appeal to the tribe's
highest court.161 A severe restraint of liberty may include tribal action
beyond actual physical detention of the claimant: the Poodry case permitted
habeas review of a tribal decision to banish certain members for treason.
Subsequent cases, though, appear to have narrowed the scope of habeas
review to situations where a claimant is in physical custody or awaiting
criminal trial before a tribal court.162 Because the federal court must
identify a violation of a substantive provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act
before issuing a writ of habeas corpus, 163 tribal violations of human rights
omitted from the Indian Civil Rights Act, such as the indigent defendant's
right to criminal defense counsel, are not cognisable in federal court. 164 The
habeas remedy thus confines federal review of tribal human rights
violations to tribal court or tribal law enforcement actions enumerated in
the Indian Civil Rights Act and resulting in ongoing wrongful detention.
Individuals alleging human rights violations have a right to an
effective remedy under international law binding on the United States.1
65
This right includes a procedural right of access to a competent tribunal
with power to fashion a remedy and a substantive right to an effective
remedy.166 Two problems arise with the domestic remedial regime: tribal
sovereign immunity often precludes access to any tribunal, whether
federal, state, or tribal, and where a tribal court has power to fashion a
remedy, if it declines to do so or its remedy proves ineffective, federal
courts lack jurisdiction to review the tribal decision.167 Municipal law
leaves the provision of remedies to the tribes, yet it is the United States
which may bear international responsibility where tribes violate individual
rights and fail to provide effective remedies.
160. See, e.g., Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207
(10th Cir. 1999).
161. See Selam v. Warm Springs Tribal Correctional Facility, 134 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1998).
162. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1996); see
also Alire v. Jackson, 65 F.Supp. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (D. Ore. 1999) (finding claim of restraint of
liberty not "severe" enough for habeas relief); Shenandoah v. Dep. of Interior, 159 F.3d 708,
714 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Habeas relief [under the ICRA] does address more than actual physical
custody.").
163. Red Elk v. Silk, 10 Indian L. Rep. 3109, 3110 (D. Mont. 1983).
164. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1976).
165. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 2(3); CAT supra note 68, art. 14; CERD, supra note 69, art.
6.
166. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 2(3); see also Joseph et al., supra note 126, at 8.
167. See Commission Report, supra note 41, at 63-67 (citing different tribal waiver policies).
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IV. ATTRIBUTION OF TRIBAL VIOLATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
A. Tribes as State Organs
"Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State."168  The United States commits an
internationally wrongful act, and its international responsibility is
engaged, if tribal violations of international human rights obligations are
attributable to it. The preceding Parts demonstrate that the tribes may
commit acts or omissions that violate the international human rights
obligations of the United States. To determine whether a tribal violation
incurs U.S. international responsibility requires a further step of examining
the principles of attribution under international law.169 The Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal has stated that "in order to attribute an act to the State, it
is necessary to identify with reasonable certainty the actors and their
association with the State."170 The International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(Articles on State Responsibility) identify several principles of attribution
that could be used to attribute tribal human rights violations to the United
States.171 Article 4 reiterates the rule of customary international law that
attributes to States the conduct of government organs regardless of their
position in the State hierarchy or branch of government. The most plausible
method of attribution would be to characterize tribes as State organs, given
their municipal status as governmental entities and the unity of the State in
international law.1 2
However, that the tribes' legal systems and political institutions exist
largely outside the federal framework would make this characterization of
tribes as organs of the federal government conceptually difficult from the
168. Articles, supra note 7, at 43.
169. Id. commentary to art. 2, at 71 ("In speaking of attribution to the State what is meant is
the State as a subject of international law. Under many legal systems, the State organs consist
of different legal persons... which are regarded as having distinct rights and obligations for
which they alone can be sued and are responsible. For the purposes of the international law
of State responsibility the position is different. The State is treated as a unity, consistent with
its recognition as a single legal person in international law. In this as in other respects the
attiribution of conduct to the State is necessarily a normative operation. What is crucial is that
a given event is sufficiently connected to conduct (whether an act or omission) which is
attributable to the State .. ").
170. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 101-02 (1987).
171. The provisions of the Articles were approved by consensus by the International Law
Commission in 2001, with recommendations to the U.N. General Assembly to consider the
possibility of convening an international conference of plenipotentiaries to examine the Draft
Articles on Responsibility with a view to adopting a convention on state responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts. The U.N. General Assembly noted the Commission's work and
annexed the Articles to a resolution in 2001. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 58-60 (2002); G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/56/58 (Dec. 12, 2001).
172. Articles, supra note 7, art. 4.
31
Cowan: International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
standpoint of U.S. municipal law. Tribes are not federated entities as their
exemption from constitutional human rights norms illustrates. United
States public law treats federally recognized tribes as separate political
communities with autonomous governments invested with inherent
powers and immunities.
Attribution of tribal human rights violations to the United States under
international law, however, does not depend upon the domestic
characterization of tribal powers; reference to municipal law for the status
of State organs is insufficient. 173  The definition of a State organ is
construed broadly in international law. Conduct of an entity exercising
public functions, such as a tribal law enforcement agency, is normally
attributed to the State even if municipal law regards the institution as an
autonomous or independent entity."' 4 The expansive definition of State
organs encompasses sub-State entities analogous to the tribes. For
instance, the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission in the Heirs of the Duc
de Guise case attributed conduct of the autonomous region of Sicily to Italy,
because the Italian state was responsible for implementation of its
international obligations notwithstanding Sicily's status in municipal
law.175 Moreover, the ILC Article 4 notes that all governments affirmed
that "the State became responsible as a result of '[a]cts or omissions of
bodies exercising public functions of a legislative or executive character'"
in preparation for the Conference on the Codification of International Law
of 1930.176 It cites a long line of cases, beginning with Montijo, which
articulate the principle that it is irrelevant for purposes of characterization
of an entity as a State organ whether the entity in question is a federated
entity or a specific autonomous area. 77
For this reason it would be remarkable if an international tribunal
considering the question of attribution of a tribal human rights violation to
the United States did not find the tribes to be organs of the United States.
After all, the U.S. states-which are federated entities unlike tribes-
function autonomously in their fields of exclusive competence. They
exercise inherent governmental powers, as do the tribes, and the
International Court of Justice has attributed responsibility to the United
States when its federated entities exercise inherent powers, even if the
national government lacks authority to compel state compliance with its
international obligations.178 Similarly, tribal conduct which breaches U.S.
international human rights obligations would naturally be attributable to
173. See id. commentary to article 4, para. 11, at 90.
174. See id. commentary to ch. II, at 82.
175. Heirs of the Duc de Guise (France v. Italy), 13 R.I.A.A. 150, 161 (1951), cited in Articles,
supra note 7, art. 4 commentary, at 88.
176. Id.
177. Id. para. 9, at 89.
178. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, at 1 111 (noting that its previous order "did not create an
obligation of result" but that the United States must "take all measures at its disposal" to
ensure state compliance.)
[Vol. 9
32
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 9 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol9/iss1/1
2006] International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations 33
the United States, because governmental organs of any type, irrespective of
their position within the State, are State organs for purposes of
attribution.179
An international tribunal should have no difficulty extending the
general principle that the State is responsible for the acts of autonomous
regions to the tribes as distinct governmental entities within the United
States. But could international law directly bind the tribes? Professors
Wouters and De Smet'80 suggest the ICJ's statement that "the Governor of
Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity with the international
undertakings of the United States"
181 means that international law obliges
federated entities to comply with the federation's international obligations.
They stretch the court's language to conclude that "federated entities
themselves could under certain conditions be held to be directly
internationally responsible for violations of international law."
182 If correct,
the tribes would be bound to act in conformity with U.S. international
human rights obligations, as a matter of international law.
This obligation is unlikely, however, since neither the tribes nor the
states have international legal personality. It is a general principle that the
statutory implementation and structuring of international human rights
norms, and the specific protection of individuals against violations of these
substantive rights, are primarily domestic concerns.
183 The ICJ's failure to
revisit the responsibility of U.S. states in Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals 84 indicates that while the U.S. may bear responsibility
for tribal human rights violations, it must also decide how best to prevent
tribal (and state) violations.
179. Articles, supra note 7, art. 4, at 43.
180. Jan Wouters & Leen De Smet, The Legal Position of Federal States and Their Federated
Entities in International Relations--The Case of Belgium 29 (Leuven Inst. for Int'l Law,
Working Paper No. 7 (2001)).
181. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S) (Provisional Measures) (Mar. 3, 1999) 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 9, at
T 28, stating:
Whereas the international responsibility of a State is engaged by the action of the
competent organs and authorities acting in that State, whatever they may be;
wheras the United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings;
whereas, according to the information available to the Court, implementation of the
measures indicated in the present Order falls within the jurisdiction of the Governor
of Arizona; whereas the Government of the United States is consequently under the
obligation to transmit the present Order to the said Governor; wheras the Governor
of Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity with the international
undertakings of the United States...
182. Wouters & De Smet, supra note 180, at 29.
183. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 61 (1993).
184. (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
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B. Tribes as Entities Exercising Governmental Authority
The conduct of entities enabled by municipal law to perform public
functions is also attributable to the State.1s  If the tribes were not
characterized as State organs for purposes of attribution, tribal human
rights violations could still be attributed to the United States under the
principle articulated in Article 5 of the Articles on State Responsibility.
This principle permits attribution of the conduct of a person or entity
which is not a State organ, but which the law of the State empowers to
exercise elements of governmental authority, provided the person or entity
acts in that capacity in that instance. 8 6 The commentary indicates that this
rule of attribution has been applied mainly to parastatal entities and
privatized government service providers. The tribes' authority to exercise
a wide range of public functions in U.S. municipal law justifies treating
them as parastatal entities that exercise governmental authority in place of
federal or state organs.
This category is a narrow one, but likely encompasses attribution of
tribal human rights violations to the United States. Unlike the preceding
principle on the attribution of the conduct of State organs, it requires
analysis of municipal law. The conduct to be attributed must be of a public
nature and the entity must exercise its power under municipal law.187
Although the source of tribal authority does not generally flow from the
basic U.S. law, the Constitution, federal common law and legislation have
long recognized tribes as entities empowered to assert their own
governmental authority. Tribal public functions include the provision of
social services, law enforcement, prisons, and courts. Tribes can also
privatize their public functions. So, for example, the conduct of a
privatized tribal prison official is attributable to the United States because
the official exercises governmental authority. This authority is tribal rather
than state or federal but is attributable to the United States because of its
public nature.
C. Tribes as Private Entities
It appears the tribes, as governmental entities, satisfy the test for State
organs under the international law of State responsibility. Judge Canby,
however, has proposed that recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence may
185. Articles, supra note 7, at 92-95.
186. Id.
187. Articles, supra note 7, at 94 ("Of particular importance will be not just the content of
the powers, but the way they are conferred on an entity, the purposes for which they are to be
exercised and the extent to which the entity is accountable to government for their exercise.
These are essentially questions of the application of a general standard to varied
circumstances.")
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articulate a theory of tribal powers as non-governmental.
188 A line of cases
implicitly characterizes tribal jurisdiction over non-members as though the
jurisdiction derives from a status analogous to private associations or
private landowners. 189  Private clubs can regulate membership and
landowners can establish rules for others on their land. If accepted, this
non-governmental view of tribal powers could impact attribution, because
international tribunals may look to municipal law for guidance in
determining whether an entity operates as a private association or a State
organ.1
90
An instructive contrast is that between tribal conduct and the conduct
of cultural or religious communities such as the Amish. The Amish govern
themselves through customary laws, live in isolated communities without
modem conveniences, speak their own language, and adhere to a strict
religious creed. It is possible for the Amish to breach members'
substantive rights under international law, such as the right to education,
191
or the right of minorities to partake in the cultural, religious, and linguistic
life of the minority community, without judicial sanction.
192 Yet Amish
communities are neither state organs nor entities exercising governmental
authority because they have no public functions or authority. Their
conduct is not generally attributable to the United States unless the United
States acknowledges or adopts the conduct as its own.
193
Unlike the Amish, the federally recognized tribes have separate legal
personality under municipal law as governmental organizations and
instrumentalities. 94 The United States recognizes the tribes' prescriptive
188. WILLIAM CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 86-87 (4th ed. 2004). See
also Bethany Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, in 16 UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 34-46
(2004).
189. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding there to be no regulatory
jurisdiction over non-member hunting and fishing activity on non-member-owned land);
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)
(holding there to be no prescriptive jurisdiction over non-member-owned land within open
area of a reservation); Strate v. A-1 Contractors et al., 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (no adjudicative
jurisdiction over tort action between non-members arising from an accident on a state
highway easement within a tribal territory); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645
(2001) (holding there to be no power to tax non-Indian activities on non-Indian-owned land
within tribal territory); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (finding no enforcement
jurisdiction over non-Indian officers engaged in investigation for off-reservation crime).
190. Articles, supra note 7, at 84-92.
191. American Declaration, supra note 70, at art. XII; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(holding Amish withdrawal of children from public school to be constitutional).
192. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 27.
193. Articles, supra note 7, 104, 188.
194. The unrecognized tribes, like the Amish, cannot be classified as State organs.
Municipal law views them as non-governmental entities, and they exercise no prescriptive or
enforcement jurisdiction. Whilst these tribes may retain residual governmental powers, they
are generally characterized as private entities. Of course, traditional tribal governments may
continue to operate, but without U.S. recognition they are no different than private
associations in municipal law. Although it is theoretically possible for an unrecognized tribe
to violate a member's right to access to minority culture or to deny retained tribal treaty rights
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and enforcement jurisdiction over non-members for the purposes of civil
adjudication and exclusion. The few decisions indicating a judicial view of
the tribes as private associations cannot overcome the substantial
precedent and current practice by which the United States treats tribes as
governments. Present law requires the federal government to engage with
tribes on a government-to-government basis. 195 Further, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently held that tribes retain inherent governmental powers over
non-member Indian criminal defendants. 96 It appears unlikely that an
international tribunal would view tribes as governmental entities when
exerting authority over Indians, but not when exerting authority over non-
Indians. This municipal recognition provides a basis for international
treatment of tribes as State organs.
While purely private conduct cannot generally be attributed to a
State, 197 the United States may be held internationally responsible for
private conduct in particular circumstances. The human rights instruments
require it to ensure the rights protected to all individuals within its
territory. It fails to meet this obligation if it allows private violations to
occur with impunity or without fear of retribution. To ensure human
rights protections, States must exercise due diligence to prevent private
conduct which breaches an individual's human rights and to investigate
and punish such violations.198 A State's omission, as a breach of its human
rights obligations, must remain analytically distinct from attribution of
private conduct, however. 199 If State agents control, direct, or approve
human rights violations committed by private actors, or decide to allow
such violations to continue, the acts are attributable to the State.200 The
commentary to Chapter II of the Articles on State Responsibility notes that
the different rules of attribution have a "cumulative effect" so that a State
may be held internationally responsible for the effects of a private entity's
conduct. If the United States fails to take necessary measures to prevent
such effects, it faces the possibility of international responsibility for
human rights violations by the Amish, unrecognized tribes, or other
private entities or actors. 201 If it knew, for example, that an unrecognized
tribe had arbitrarily detained and mistreated an individual, but permitted
the detention to continue, the tribal conduct would then be attributed to
to individuals, these breaches are not generally attributable to the United States.
195. Proclamation No. 7620, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,773 (Nov. 1, 2002) ("To enhance our efforts to
help Indian nations be self-governing, self-supporting, and self-reliant, my Administration
will continue to honor tribal sovereignty by working on a government-to-government basis
with American Indians....').
196. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
197. Articles, supra note 7, at 119-23.
198. Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 170 (1988).
199. Id. 166. (holding State responsible for breach of obligation to ensure rights although
private act which caused substantive harm was not attributable to the State).
200. Articles, supra note 7, at 103, 118.
201. Id. at 84-92.
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it.202
D. Tribal Agents Exceeding Authority
A tribal agent may incur U.S. international responsibility for conduct
that violates an individual's human rights even if the agent acts outside his
or her sphere of authority or violates tribal or federal law.
203 In Linneen,2° 4
the non-Indian claimants asserted that a uniformed tribal law enforcement
officer arbitrarily detained them for three to four hours, pointed his gun at
their heads, threatened to seize their property and kill their animals, and
told them immediately to accept Jesus Christ as their savior, because he
was going to kill them and dispose their bodies in the wilderness. Such
action by a tribal official violates international prohibitions on arbitrary
detention and, possibly, provisions on cruel or inhuman treatment. Tribal
sovereign immunity shielded the officer and tribe from suit in tribal and
federal court because he was acting in his official capacity at the time.
Although such arbitrary detention and mistreatment goes beyond the tribal
officer's legitimate powers, this does not affect attribution.
20 5
The Caire claim demonstrates that such ultra vires actions by tribal
public officials are attributable to the United States. In Caire, the tribunal
held that the conduct of public officers, even if they act outside their
competence, involves the responsibility of the State if the officials act
"under cover of their status.. .and use[] means placed at their disposal on
account of that status."
20 6 Whether a tribal official acts in his or her official
capacity depends on whether the officer was "cloaked with governmental
authority." 207 Tribal police, wardens, and other tribal officials, operate as
public officials within tribal territory. The rules of attribution make
conduct of such governmental officials attributable to the State, even if
such conduct exceeds the officials' authority under tribal or federal law.
208
V. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL REMEDIAL MECHANISMS
The United States has not accepted the individual petition mechanisms
which enable the U.N. human rights monitoring bodies (the Human Rights
Committee, the Committee Against Torture, and the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination) to consider individual complaints, to
202. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 
I.C.J. 3,
67-70 (judgment of May 24).
203. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 170 (1988).
204. Linneen v. Gila River Indian Community, 276 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2002).
205. ICCPR, supra note 67, at 175; American Declaration, supra note 70, arts. I, XXV.
206. Articles, supra note 7, commentary to art.7, at 101 (citing 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 531 (1929)).
207. Petrolane, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, 92 (1991).
208. Articles, supra note 7, art. 7, at 44.
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reach views on the merits, and to recommend remedies.209 Thus, an
individual deprived of his or her due process rights or tortured by an
American Indian tribe could not bring a petition before the Human Rights
Committee or the Committee Against Torture. However, it is possible for
the monitoring bodies to address alleged tribal violations of U.S. human
rights obligations through the State reporting, inquiry, and inter-State
complaint procedures (though the inter-State complaint mechanisms have
never been used).210 Until the recent United States withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol on compulsory jurisdiction to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations takes effect,211 the ICJ would also have jurisdiction over
disputes if a tribal government were to violate a foreign national's right to
consular notification.212  Alternatively, if a tribe interferes with the
substantive rights of a foreign national, the injured party's state may seek
redress through international dispute resolution mechanisms and
diplomatic pressure.
The regional inter-American human rights regime allows injured
individuals or groups to petition the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. This mechanism extends to violations of the American
Declaration, a source of international obligations binding on all
Organization of American States (OAS) member states, and therefore
permits petitions against the United States, which is not a state party to the
American Convention on Human Rights. The United States has objected to
the American Declaration's binding character.213 Nevertheless, the Inter-
American Commission has several times asserted authority to declare the
209. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; CAT, supra note 68, art. 22; CERD, supra note 69, art. 14.
210. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 41; CAT, supra note 68, art. 21; CERD, supra note 69, art. 11.
Only the CAT includes the inquiry mechanism. CAT, supra note 68, art. 20.
211. Although the United States withdrawal appears to be effective immediately, the ICJ
would likely find a period of notification required. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 73, art. 56. The United States is not a state party but regards its provisions
as declaratory of customary international law. See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines,
214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We therefore treat the Vienna Convention as an authoritative
guide to the customary international law of treaties."); Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40 (11th Cir. 1999), quoting Kreimerman v. Casa
Veerkamp S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although the United States is not
a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna
Convention as codifying the international law of treaties.").
212. See, e.g., LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of June 27), at 514
(holding that the I.C.J. has jurisdiction over Germany's complaints against the United States
under the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlment of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations when Arizona, a sub-state entity, breached the United
States' consular obligations); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Judgment of Mar. 31), 153(2)-(6) (rejecting the United States' objection to ICJ jurisdiction
and finding the U.S. in breach of its consular relation obligations, although several of the
violations were committed by, and under municipal law within the sole power of, state
governments).
213. See Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2001); Juan Raul Garza v. United
States, Case 12.243, Report No. 52/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at
1255 (Apr. 4, 2001).
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United States in breach of its international obligations under the
Declaration and to make recommendations on remedial measures.
2 14 The
Inter-American Commission has also declared the United States
responsible for violations of rules of customary international law and jus
cogens norms relative to human rights.
2 15 If the United States fails to
comply with recommendations of the Inter-American Commission, the
Commission may ratify and publicize its report and submit it to the OAS
General Assembly. It continues evaluating measures adopted in respect of
its recommendations until compliance is achieved.
21 6
Exactly which rights individuals possess under this regional system is
a matter of some controversy. The revised OAS Charter refers to
"fundamental rights," but does not define the phrase.
2 7 The Inter-
American Commission has interpreted it to mean the American
Declaration principles read "in light of" current international law,
2 18 which
extends its reach beyond the Declaration principles themselves.
.This interpretive method has implications for the study of potential
tribal human rights violations because it allows the Inter-American
Commission to declare responsibility for international obligations beyond
those espoused in the Declaration. For instance, the Inter-American
Commission has interpreted the Declaration in light of Article 27 of the
ICCPR on individual rights to partake in minority culture, which the tribes
are in a unique legal position to violate through tribal laws defining
membership and the quasi-criminal punishment of tribal banishment. The
Inter-American Commission has relied on this ICCPR provision to find
violations of American Declaration protections including the right to life,
liberty, and personal security (Article I); the right to residence and
movement (Article VIII); and the right to the preservation of health and to
well-being (Article XI).219 The Inter-American Commission has also based
violations of the Declaration's right to a fair trial and due process of law
'214. See, e.g., Baby Boy Case, supra note 71; Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9467,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 3/87 46-49 (1987); Salas v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 31/93 (1999).
215. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02 43-50
(2002).
216. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF INTER-AM. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, in 2000 INTER-AM.
C.H.R. ANN. REP. 1495, 1511, arts. 45,46 (amended Oct. 25, 2002 and Oct. 24, 2003).
217. 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 2 U.S.T. 2394, Mar. 2, 1948, preamble, arts. 3(1), 12.
218. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights takes into account "the corpus juris gentium
of international human rights law" when interpreting the American Declaration. Dann v.
United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02/OEA/Ser. L/V/II 717, doc. 1
rev. 1 96-98 (2001).
219. The Yanomami Case, Case 7615 (Brazil), Inter-Am C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10
rev. 1 24, 31 (1985); IACHR 'Report on the Situation on the Human Rights of a Segment of
the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin (Nicaragua)' OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc 10 rev. 3
(1983). It has also interpreted the American Convention on Human Rights in light of Article
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1, at 03-04
(1997).
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provisions (Articles XVIII and XXVI) on U.S. obligations to foreign
nationals and their States under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.220
The Inter-American Commission's individual petition mechanism
provides one avenue for those alleging human rights violations by the
United States to pursue a claim before an international tribunal. The
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule applies to Inter-American
Commission petitions, but tribal sovereign immunity may preclude pursuit
of any tribal or federal remedy. Tribal courts may or may not have
jurisdiction over the claim depending on whether the particular tribe limits
immunity from suit in cases alleging violations of human rights. Of course,
even if the tribal court fashions a remedy it may prove ineffective and
permit a challenge at the inter-American level. Even where tribes waive
immunity from suit, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity also
prevents an appeal to federal court, except in cases of ongoing physical
custody. This situation permits an injured individual in most human rights
cases to overcome the Inter-American Commission's exhaustion of
domestic remedies hurdle by exhausting whatever tribal remedies are
made available. Appeals to federal courts should not be required as they
generally lack jurisdiction to review human rights claims against the tribes.
In the recent Dann case, the Commission found the United States
responsible for violations of international law related to its wrongful taking
of Western Shoshone tribal lands. In particular, it concluded that the
United States failed to ensure the Danns' American Declaration rights to a
fair trial, to property, and to equality before the law.221 The Commission
recommended that the United States provide the petitioners with an
effective remedy, including adoption of legislative or other measures to
ensure respect for their right to property.222 It further recommended that
the United States ensure that property rights of indigenous persons are
determined in accordance with the rights established in the American
Declaration.223 The case marked the first instance of an international
human rights body finding the United States responsible for violating
human rights specific to an indigenous people. Tribes have heralded Dann
as a model for future complaints against the United States to promote tribal
interests. Yet tribes may not realize that the Inter-American Commission's
individual petition mechanism also permits the Commission to consider
claims against the United States for human rights violations by the tribes
themselves.
A case such as Linneen, where a tribal official allegedly arbitrarily
220. Villareal v. United States, Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/02 5 (2002);
Fierro v. United States, Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 99/03 40 (2003).
221. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02/OEA/Ser.
L/V/II 717, doc. 1 rev. 1 172 (2001).
222. Dann, Case No. 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at 173(1).
223. Dann, Case No. 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at 173(2).
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detained and mistreated individuals, provides an ideal candidate. If it, or a
similar case, were to come before the Inter-American Commission and a
tribe had in fact violated individual human rights provisions binding on
the United States, the Commission could attribute such conduct to the
United States. The Commission could then declare the United States
responsible for both the tribal violation and the lack of an effective remedy
in the tribal or federal legal systems. The Commission would likely
recommend compensation and provision of an effective remedy, and
evaluate implementation of its recommendations. 224 Tribal human rights
violations may arise in other contexts as well. The Linneen claimants were
U.S. nationals, but foreign nationals could similarly find themselves subject
to mistreatment by a tribal officer potentially creating an international
dispute for mistreatment of aliens.
Although no international monitoring body has yet investigated
human rights violations by tribal governments, the U.S. Commission for
Civil Rights has recommended that Congress establish extensive Indian
Civil Rights Act reporting procedures to monitor the need for future
amendments. Under its proposal the tribes must annually report the
disposition of all Indian Civil Rights Act claims including the alleged
violation, the tribal forum in which the complaint was filed, the potential
for appeal, and the types of remedies available. 225 The reports would
enable Congress to monitor the success or shortcomings of the Indian
judicial systems, but Congress has not yet mandated such a reporting
scheme. Additionally, President Clinton established a body whose
mandate included a review of tribal human rights violations, but it has not
issued any reports or recommendations.
226
CONCLUSION
U.S. federal and state law largely reflects the United States
224. Whether the United States would ever recognize the authority of the Commission to
make such a recommendation, or the legitimacy of such a decision, is, of course, doubtful.
The United States communications with the Commission regarding the Dann case and its
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol on Compulsory Dispute Resolution to the Vienna
Treaty on Consular Relations in response to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") decisions
in LaGrand and Avena demonstrate its unwillingness to recognize or to comply with external
decisions regarding its implementation of human rights norms. See, e.g., Response of the
Government of the United States, Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 53/02 (Oct. 10, 2002); 2002 DEP'T STATE DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 367-82 (2003)
(extensive U.S. response to the Dann final report); Adam Liptak, US Says It Has Withdrawn
From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at A16. The tribes, on the other hand, may
be willing to take measures to prevent future findings of U.S. international responsibility, both
to prevent U.S. actions which may limit tribal sovereignty and to gain legitimacy as subjects
under international law.
225. Commission Report, supra note 41, at 72-74.
226. Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998).
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international human rights obligations and enables the federal and state
judiciaries to fashion appropriate remedies where individual rights are
violated. The map of American human rights law, however, contains
substantive lacunae in legislative implementation against the American
Indian tribes, which have authority to engage in conduct that may
constitute a breach of an international human rights obligation of the
United States. While the United States represents to the Human Rights
Committee that "[tihe Constitution greatly restricts the ability of the
government at all levels to infringe on the liberty of its citizens... "227 this
is simply untrue with respect to tribal governments, which are not bound
by the constitutional protections.
Procedural gaps also exist. Although the federal Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 superficially reflects certain U.S. international human rights
obligations, most remedies for violations of the Act are only available in
tribal courts. Further, these tribal courts may deny claimants access on the
basis of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.
Tribal violations of U.S. international human rights obligations are
attributable to the United States because the tribes are governmental
entities within municipal law, and as such fall under the rubric of State
organs. The United States, therefore, commits an internationally wrongful
act whenever tribal conduct breaches an individual's substantive rights
protected by international law and binding upon the United States. It can
thus be held internationally responsible for tribal acts it does not control
and for which its judiciary cannot fashion a remedy.
The disjuncture between U.S. international human rights commitments
and its domestic implementation against the tribes must be rectified: the
United States is bound by international law to adopt measures to give
effect to its international human rights obligations. No domestic legal
obstacles exist to federal legislation implementing international human
rights obligations against the tribes because Congress retains plenary
legislative power over them.228 If the United States wishes to correct the
gaps identified in its legislative implementation, the Indian Civil Rights
Act should be revised to reflect fully international human rights
instruments binding on the United States. Furthermore, to protect the
United States from international responsibility for acts or omissions of
tribal governments, Congress may decide that it is in the best interests of
the United States to limit tribal sovereign immunity explicitly in cases
where individuals allege human rights violations and to give federal courts
the power to review tribal court decisions implicating substantive
individual rights. If Congress wishes to protect the United States from
being found internationally responsible, the federal courts could also be
given the power to fashion remedies, including compensation, for tribal
227. HRC Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994), para. 203.
228. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
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human rights violations.
The tribes, meanwhile, might avoid or at least discourage such federal
intrusion upon their independence by incorporating international human
rights obligations into the tribal legal system, and carefully complying with
those rights. This might require waiving tribal sovereign immunity for
suits against tribal officials alleged to have violated human rights, and
enabling tribal courts to develop appropriate remedies for such violations,
including compensation, along the lines of federal and state waivers.
Otherwise, a case like Linneen may eventually find its way to an
international monitoring body and the United States may be found
responsible for the tribal conduct. Such a finding would create intense
domestic pressure for restrictions on tribal independence and self-
government.
Indications are that some tribes have recognized the dilemma. The
proposed Blackfoot Nation Constitution, for example, incorporates
international human rights protections. 229 Other tribes, such as the Colville
Confederated Tribes, have incorporated international law as a source of
law in its tribal code. 230 These developments should be encouraging for
those who desire greater tribal independence, but, unless the tribes remain
vigilant and provide effective remedies for alleged human rights
violations, the potential exists for more intrusive federal restrictions and
oversight.
229. BLACKFOOT NATION CONST. (Proposed Constitution), arts. 5(2) & 8, cited in Taiawagi
Helton, Nation Building in Indian Country: The Blackfoot Constitutional Review, 8 KAN. J.L & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 1 (2003).
230. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Seymour, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6008 (Colville Ct. App.
1995).
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